is treated as an implied gift of that heir's share under the intestacy statute to the testator's other heirs. 5 Nearly all American courts, however, have held that the heir is entitled to his intestate share despite the testator's expression of a contrary intent. 6 New York 7 and Louisiana s are the only American jurisdictions that recognize the validity of negative wills.
Part I of this comment examines the treatment of negative wills in American and English courts. Part II shows that the "American rule" is unsatisfactory because it furthers no important policy underlying the law of wills and because it unnecessarily frustrates the testator's intent. Part III shows that it is proper to apply the implied-gift doctrine to negative wills when a testator expresses a clear intent to exclude an heir or limit the heir's gift to See 8 See Succession of Allen, 48 La. Ann. 1036, 1049, 20 So. 193, 198 (1896) .
the devise contained in the will. Under this approach, the excluded heir is treated as if he had predeceased the testator, and his share of the intestate portion of the estate is divided among the testator's remaining heirs.
I. COMMON LAW TREATMENT OF NEGATIVE WILLS

A. The English Rule
In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, English courts disagreed about whether a negative will could foreclose the award of an intestate share to an excluded heir. In 1706, the House of Lords held in Vachell v. Breton 9 that a devise of "10 shillings, and no more" to the decedent's children barred them from receiving an intestate share of the estate. 1 " Although the reporter did not provide the court's rationale for this conclusion, the court may have adopted the appellants' argument that granting an intestate share to the testator's children would in effect "mak[e] a new will for him" because he had intended the children to receive only the devise contained in his will."
Most English courts, however, initially avoided the application of the rule in Vachell J 2 and instead held that a negative will could not prevent an heir from receiving his share of any property that passed by intestacy.' s Two justifications were offered for this result. First, negative wills were considered to be invalid because, under the law of succession, only an affirmative disposition of the decedent's property could prevent an heir from receiving his intes- 
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tate share.
14 In addition, negative wills were thought to amount to an impermissible attempt to alter the distribution scheme provided in the intestacy statute."
Despite the initial disagreement, English courts reached a consensus by the mid-nineteenth century that negative wills were enforceable if two conditions were met:' 6 the testator clearly expressed an intent to limit an heir to the devise (if any) contained in the will, and at least one other heir remained eligible to receive the intestate property. 7 This result was achieved through the application of the implied-gift doctrine:' 8 the negative will vas interpreted as a gift of the excluded heir's portion of the intestate property to the testator's other heirs. 19 
B. The American Rule
Beginning with Jackson ex rel. Bogert v. Schauber° in 1827, most American courts have rejected the modern English rule, 2 ' holding instead that a testator may prevent an heir from receiving his share of any property that passes by intestacy only by affirmatively disposing of the entire estate through a will. 22 Although no court has expressly adopted a family-protection rationale, negative wills might also be prohibited where it is thought necessary to protect a testator's close relatives from disinheritance. See M. RHEINSTEIN (property "not effectively disposed of" by will passes to decedent's statutory heirs).
" ' See, e.g., In re Estate of Barker, 448 So. 2d 28, 31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (testator can disinherit an heir only" 'by making a testamentary disposition of the property inconsistent with the normal course of descent' ") (quoting Annot., 100 A.L.R.2D 325, 327-28 (1965)); Lawes v. Lynch, 7 N.J. Super. 584, 590, 72 A.2d 414, 418 (decedent can exclude an heir only "by effectively devising and bequeathing his property to others" because "[i]t is the law, not the testator, that confers the right of succession and determines who shall take the property ative wills have been prohibited on the ground that their enforcement would "mix" the probate and intestacy systems: a decedent's property "must go by devise or descent; and in either mode it goes entirely uncontrolled by the other; and it is impossible to conceive of an estate created by a mixture of the two." 26 Third, some courts have suggested that negative wills are invalid because their enforcement would require "judicial will drafting": the court would have to determine who should receive the excluded heir's intestate share without any guidance from the testator's will.
27
A few American courts, however, have adopted the English rule, 28 employing a rationale similar to that in Vachell: 29 where a testator clearly intended to exclude an heir, the courts should give effect to that intention.° In addition, these courts have reasoned that, because the intestacy statute is intended to apply only where the testator has not expressed a more specific intent in a will, 1 the statute should not be used to defeat the testator's express inten- Ct. 1952) (a negative will cannot deprive an heir of his intestate share because a decedent "'must be one of two things-a dead man with a will, or a dead man without one, not a sort of posthumous entity' ") ( 
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pose of the law of wills is to implement the testator's intent. 3 " Nevertheless, it is proper to restrict testamentary freedom where it conflicts with an overriding public policy, such as family protection or the prevention of "dead hand" control of property. 37 Unless the enforcement of the testator's intent expressed in a negative will would undermine either the principle of testamentary freedom or conflict with some overriding public policy, there can be no justification for the approach taken by a majority of American courts.
A. Frustration of the Testator's Intent
The American rule defeats the testator's intention, expressed in a valid will, to exclude an heir. A typical example would occur where a childless testator provides in his will that his sister is to be "deprived of any interest whatsoever" in his estate and that his uncle is to receive the entire estate. If the testator's uncle predeceases him, the devise to the uncle lapses, 3 and the estate will pass by intestacy; if the testator's sister is his heir under the intestacy statute, the American rule requires the award of an intestate share to the sister, even though the testator expressly denied her any part of his estate. In fact, while we can only guess how the testator would have wanted his property to be distributed if it could not go to his uncle, we can be certain of one thing-he did not want any of his estate to go to his sister.
The application of the intestacy statute in this situation is also inconsistent With the basic purpose of that statute. The intestacy cussing various proposals to reform the rule against perpetuities, which defeats a testator's intent in order to promote the alienability of property); R. WELLMAN, L. WAGGONER & 0. BROWDER, PALMER'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRUSTS AND SUCCESSION 123-25 (4th ed. 1983) (mortmain statutes designed to prevent the disinheritance of close relatives in favor of charities have been repealed in nearly every state), widespread support for testamentary freedom, see, e.g., Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra, at 336 (89% of those surveyed believed that there should be no restrictions on the power of testation), and the fact that this power is rarely abused, see, e.g., Friedman, 38 In the absence of an applicable anti-lapse statute or a residuary clause in the will, a devise to a person who predeceases the testator lapses and that property will pass by intes- system is designed to implement the testator's probable intent in the absence of a will. 9 Where a testator has made a negative will, however, it is anomalous to frustrate his actual intent by mechanically following the statutory scheme of intestacy: the testator's own will shows that he preferred his own plan of distribution to that provided by the intestacy statute. 40 This inconsistency with the principle of testamentary freedom has caused a further problem under the American rule: courts often adopt strained "constructions" of wills in order to circumvent the prohibition on negative wills. 41 In In re Estate of Weissmann, 42 for example, the testator, Caesar Weissmann, provided that his property was to pass to the "Estate of Caesar Weissmann," and stated that his niece Adelaide was to take nothing. 43 Since a devise to the testator's "estate" is usually interpreted as a devise to those who would be his heirs under the intestacy statute, 44 the application of the American rule should have resulted in Weissmann's heirs (including his niece Adelaide) receiving his property. In order to give effect to the testator's intent, however, the court interpreted "Estate of Caesar Weissmann" to mean all of Weissmann's heirs except Adelaide. Thus, the court was able to hold that none of his estate passed by intestacy. 45 The use of the "construction" rubric in negative will cases is a highly unsatisfactory method of mitigating the harsh results produced by the American rule. Because there can be no principled 11 See, method for determining when a negative will should be "construed" to avoid frustrating the testator's intent, 4 6 the use of strained constructions imposes costs on the probate system. It creates uncertainty for all parties because they cannot easily predict when a court will strictly apply the American rule and when that rule will be circumvented. This uncertainty increases litigation because both the party contesting the will and the proponent of the will have incentives to litigate: each can argue that his case is distinguishable from prior cases. 47 
B. Justifications for the American Rule
Courts that refuse to enforce negative wills offer three principal justifications for this limitation on testamentary freedom: (1) negative wills would create an undesirable "mixing" of the probate and intestacy systems by requiring courts to alter the distribution scheme provided in the intestacy statute;" (2) because negative wills do not expressly indicate who should receive the excluded heir's share of the property that passes by intestacy, their enforcement would in effect require courts to draft new wills for testators; 49 and (3) negative wills are inconsistent with the law of succession, which generally provides that property not disposed of by the will shall descend as provided in the intestacy statute. 50 None of these rationales, however, withstands analysis.
The first argument-that a decedent's property must pass either by devise or by intestacy but not by a "mixture" of the two systems-simply states a conclusion: no court has explained why it would be undesirable to "mix" the probate and intestacy systems. In fact, courts routinely permit such "mixing" in cases of partial testacy: where a will disposes of only part of a testator's estate, the rest of his property passes to his heirs under the intestacy statute. 51 For example, a testator may have devised one-half of his 4 Cf. Langbein, supra note 35, at 525 (arguing that the rule of strict compliance with Wills Act formalities has produced "results so harsh" that courts have developed "a vast, contradictory, unpredictable and sometimes dishonest caselaw" in order to avoid frustrating testators' intent).
47 Cf. Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 36, at 566 (courts' use of the "construction" rubric in recent mistake decisions permits "litigants defending future claims based upon [those decisions to] object that these were mistake cases in disguise, wrongly decided on account of the failure of the deciding courts to recognize that the no-reformation rule obtains its force from the Wills Act"). 48 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. property to his niece and one-half to his aunt. If his aunt predeceases him and his will does not contain a residuary clause, his niece will receive one-half of the estate under the will, and the other half will pass by intestacy. 2 In situations analogous to negative wills, moreover, "mixing" the probate and intestacy systems is not controversial. For example, courts have little difficulty enforcing a provision in a will that property is to be distributed according to the intestacy statute." Courts will even implement a provision in a will that the testator's property is to be distributed according to the intestacy statute except as modified in one or more respects. 5 4 Such provisions differ from negative wills in only one way: they incorporate the intestacy statute expressly, while negative wills incorporate the statute implicitly. 5 5 In either case, a court must enforce a will by examining both the will and the intestacy statute in order to determine how the estate should be distributed. Yet the American rule leads to the anomalous result that courts enforce the express incorporation of the intestacy statute while prohibiting the implied incorporation.
The second and third justifications for the American rulethat enforcing a negative will would require a court to make a new will for the testator and that the exclusion of an heir does not affirmatively dispose of the testator's property as required by the law of succession-rest on the assumption that the mere exclusion of an heir in the will provides a court with no guidance in determining how to distribute the intestate share. This assumption is unjustified, however, because, as will be shown below, the exclusion of an heir in a negative will necessarily constitutes an implied gift of the intestate share to the testator's remaining heirs.
ing in the law precludes a testator from disposing of only a portion of his estate by will and allowing the balance to be distributed according to the laws of intestate succession.") ( 
III. THE IMPLIED-GIFT DOCTRINE AND NEGATIVE WILLS
Courts in England 56 enforce negative wills on the theory that a negative will creates an implied gift of the excluded heir's intestate share to the testator's other heirs. 57 Most American courts, however, have refused to apply the implied-gift doctrine to negative wills on the ground that the testator's intent is ambiguous: he may have wanted the excluded heir to receive only the devise (if any) in his will, or he may simply have intended to express a preference for other beneficiaries of his will over the excluded heir. 5 8 This reasoning is flawed because it conflates two distinct issues: whether a testator intended to limit an heir strictly to the devise (if any) in the will, and whether a testator who intended his heir to receive only what was devised in the will would have wanted the property that passes by intestacy to go to the remaining heirs. In fact, the testator's intent to exclude an heir will be quite clear in many negative will situations. Rather than presuming that the testator's intent is ambiguous, the courts should first examine the will to determine if his intent is actually ambiguous. The objections raised by these courts can be satisfied if the implied-gift doctrine is applied only where the testator's intent to exclude an heir is clear, not where it is ambiguous. 59 The implied-gift doctrine has been applied in a wide variety of cases to fill gaps in testamentary schemes, 60 especially where a will fails to provide a gift over following a life estate. 11 Some American jurisdictions also, at one time, enforced negative wills on this theory. . 273, 276-78, 152 N.E. 356, 357-58 (1926) (provision in will that heirs were disinherited "for the purposes of this will" held insufficient to show that the testator intended to exclude them from receiving an intestate share). For a discussion of the proper treatment of the problem of ambiguous wills, see infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text. to receive Blackacre. In this situation, some courts have refused to infer a remainder to A's children because, "though this may have been the intention of the testator, he did not express it, and the court has no right to make a will for him. 61 Most courts faced with such a gap in the testamentary scheme, however, have found an implied gift to A's children in the event that A should die with children.
6 2 This result has been justified on the ground that, in most cases, the use of this language reflects T's desire that A's children receive Blackacre 6 Under this approach, the court considers what the testator probably intended to accomplish and then recognizes a gift by implication where one is necessary to fulfill this intent. While the implication of a gift cannot be based on mere speculation, it need not be the only possible interpretation of the testamentary scheme; 4 if it were the only one, it would be express, not implied.
In the context of negative wills, finding an implied gift to the testator's other heirs also serves to implement the testator's probable intent.
6 5 It is usually clear that the testator wanted the ex- 05 Most American courts have refused to find implied gifts to a testator's other heirs on the ground that a negative will "does not give rise to an implication so strong as to leave no reasonable doubt" that the testator intended his other heirs to receive the excluded heir's intestate share. cluded heir to receive only the devise in the will or nothing at all; the testator has simply failed to provide for an alternative disposition of the estate in the event of the failure of a devise. In such situations, English courts have assumed that the testator probably would have wanted his other heirs, not the excluded heir, to receive the property that passes by intestacy."' Although this assumption may sometimes be inaccurate (for example, the testator may not have cared who received his property so long as the excluded heir receives nothing), it most closely approximates what most testators would have wanted had they foreseen this contingency. 67 Thus, where a testator clearly intended to exclude an heir in his will and some of the estate passes by intestacy, the testator's intent is best fulfilled by implying a gift of the excluded heir's intestate share to the testator's other heirs.
Courts following the American rule have recognized properly that, under a less restrictive rule, a gift to a testator's other heirs might be inferred where the testator's intent to exclude an heir is ambiguous. 6 8 This creates a danger that the testator's actual intent might be frustrated.
6 9 Adopting a per se rule that negative wills special power of appointment); Cretecos v. Lucia, 335 Mass. 678, 679-80, 141 N.E.2d 833, 834 (1957) (where testator had given beneficiary a house but not the land underneath it, court found gift by implication of right to sufficient use of the land to make the house habitable); see also supra text accompanying notes 60-63 (courts usually imply gift over to A's children where will devises "life estate to A, and if A dies without children, remainder to B"). Moreover, the implied-gift doctrine, as formulated by English courts, is very similar to the formulation of the doctrine in American courts, compare 95 C.J.S. Wills § 595, at 784 (1957) ("[Tlhe probability of an intention to make the devise or bequest implied must appear from the will to be so strong that an intention to the contrary cannot reasonably be supposed to have existed in the testator's mind.") (footnote omitted), with 1 C. SHERRIN, R BARLOW & R. WALLINGTON, WILLIAMS' LAW RELATING TO WILLS 740 (5th ed. 1980) (impliedgift doctrine "is based, not on a necessity, but on so strong a probability of intention to benefit the persons in question that a contrary intention cannot be supposed") (footnote omitted), and English courts have had little difficulty in finding the inference raised by a negative will to be sufficient to imply a gift to the testator's other heirs, see supra note 19 and accompanying text. 7 In a negative will case, a testator has expressed an intent that a certain heir should receive only what was devised in the will, and the award of an intestate share to that heir would defeat his intent. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. Although testators generally do not consider the possibility that some of their property might pass by intestacy where they have made a will, see 4 W. BowE & D. PARKER, supra note 1, § 30.15, at 109 (where "testator has attempted to dispose of all his property. . . [he no doubt] thinks that he has accomplished this purpose"), it is probable that the maker of a negative will would have wanted any intestate property to go to his other heirs, not the heir that he specifically excluded, had he considered this possibility.
" See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. 9 For example, the testator may simply have intended to express a preference for the beneficiaries in the will over the excluded heir. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
cannot prevent an heir from receiving his share of any intestate property, 0 however, is an unnecessarily restrictive response.
7 1 The evidentiary concern can be satisfactorily addressed, without frustrating the testator's intent in clear cases, by placing the burden of proof" on the proponent of the will (the heir who will benefit if another heir is excluded) .' Extrinsic evidence of the testator's intent at the time the will was executed might also be admitted to resolve any ambiguity about the testator's intent to exclude an heir. 4 He may not have intended that the heir be excluded in favor of other heirs who are not beneficiaries in the will. 70 See supra text accompanying note 22. 71 This comment uses the term "burden of proof" to refer to both the initial "burden of production" and the "burden of persuasion." For a discussion of the distinction between these two concepts, see EDWARD CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 336 (3d ed. 1984).
71 In cases where the will provides simply that a certain heir is to receive a small devise or that the heir is disinherited "only for the purposes of this will," see supra note 59, the proponents of the will (the testator's other heirs) will not be able to show that the testator would have wanted them to receive the intestate property to the exclusion of the heir whose share was limited. Because testators generally do not consider the possibility that their will might fail to dispose of all their property, see supra note 67, it is probable that the testator's limitation of the gift to one heir was intended merely to express a preference for other beneficiaries of the will.
7'
Although there will usually be no extrinsic evidence available on the issue of whether the testator would have wanted his other heirs, not the excluded heir, to receive any intestate property, cf. Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 36, at 539 (in cases involving implied future interests, testators usually have not considered what should be done to fill a gap in their testamentary scheme), extrinsic evidence may be helpful in establishing whether the testator intended to limit an heir to what was devised in the will. Where there is an ambiguity in the will, extrinsic evidence at the time of the execution of the will should be admissi- 28 . In a jurisdiction that holds a strong presumption against the admission of extrinsic evidence to interpret the terms of a will, the enforcement of negative wills may justifiably be denied on this ground. Such a rule should not, however, be used to deny the validity of negative wills in cases where the testator's intent is unambiguous.
Application of the implied-gift doctrine would also satisfy the other objections to negative wills that underlie the American rule. 5 First, a negative will can now be seen as affirmatively disposing of a decedent's property: the exclusion of an heir constitutes a gift by implication of that heir's intestate share to the testator's other heirs. This renders inapplicable the rule that all property not affirmatively disposed of by will must pass according to the intestacy statute. Second, courts are not forced to speculate about who should receive the testator's property because the order of distribution is provided by the intestacy statute: the excluded heir is treated as having predeceased the testator, and the testator's other heirs receive what would otherwise have gone to the excluded heir.
7 6 Finally, the claim that it is undesirable to "mix" the probate and intestacy systems 7 7 is satisfied because all of the estate passes under the will; the negative will is no more objectionable on this ground than a will that expressly incorporates the intestacy statute. 8 The use of the implied-gift doctrine in negative will cases will not unduly burden probate courts. Most testators who want to exclude heirs would not rely solely on this doctrine: in order to foreclose possible litigation over such issues as whether the testator intended to prevent an heir from receiving his share of any intestate property by excluding him in the Will, their lawyers will continue to put residuary clauses in wills. 79 The primary beneficiaries of this rule would be unsuspecting testators who, acting without expert legal advice, draft negative wills thinking that they will bar certain heirs from receiving more than the devise (if any) in the will. 80 Thus, this rule would serve to promote the implementation of the testator's intent and would require courts to engage in an inquiry into that intent in only a small class of cases. 8 79 Cf. Langbein, supra note 35, at 524 (arguing that expert draftsmen will not rely on a proposed substantial-compliance doctrine because "they opt for maximum formality, in order to be in the best possible position to defend the will against any claim of imposition or want of finality"). "I A more restrictive rule would be easier to administer (if the court was willing to accept the harsh results it would produce), but only at the cost of defeating the testator's intent-the very purpose that the law of wills is intended to promote. See supra notes 35-application of the implied-gift doctrine may in fact decrease litigation. By confining the issue to whether the testator's intent was clear, either on the face of the will or with the admission of extrinsic evidence, the results of litigation should be more predictable: there will no longer be any need for escape valves from the American rule-such as creative "construction" of the terms of a will -that are often arbitrarily or inconsistently applied.
CONCLUSION
Historically, many of the rules of the law of wills have been traps for uninformed draftsmen. 83 Such rules have been disappearing recently because of a growing awareness that they complicate the law of succession without serving any legitimate policy. 4 The American rule that an heir excluded in a negative will must nevertheless be awarded his share of any intestate property should also be discarded because it defeats the testator's intent and furthers no important policy of the law of wills. It should be replaced by the English rule that the express exclusion of an heir in a will constitutes a valid implied gift of his intestate share to the testator's other heirs. This approach best effectuates the testator's intent because a testator who has used a negative will would probably have wanted his other heirs, not the heir excluded in his will, to receive the property that passes by intestacy.
